## SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO

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INSURANCE COMMISSIONER OF THE

CALIFORNIA INSURANCE COMPANY, a

Applicant,

Respondent.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA.

California corporation,

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Case No.: 19-CIV-06531

Assigned for All Purposes to Hon. Danny Y. Chou

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY

FILED SAN MATEO COUNTY

APR 2 6 2021

Clerk of the Superior Court

DEPUTY CLERK

On November 4, 2019, this Court appointed Applicant the Insurance Commissioner of California (Commissioner) the Conservator of Respondent California Insurance Company (CIC) pursuant to Insurance Code section 1011. (See Order Appointing Ins. Comr. as Conservator and Restraining Orders.) On October 19, 2020, the Commissioner filed an Application for Order Approving Rehabilitation Plan (Rehabilitation Application). CIC filed this Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery (Motion) on March 11, 2021.

The Court heard CIC's Motion on April 22, 2021 at 2:00 p.m. Michael Strumwasser and Cynthia Larsen appeared on behalf of the Commissioner. Shand Stephens appeared on behalf of CIC. Having considered all papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion, oral arguments of the parties, all testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, and all other pleadings and papers on file herein, the Court grants the Motion.

## BACKGROUND

On November 4, 2019, the Commissioner filed a Verified Ex Parte Application for Order Appointing Insurance Commissioner as Conservator (Conservator Application). The Court granted the Conservator Application on that same day and appointed the Commissioner the conservator of CIC pursuant to Insurance Code section 1011, subdivision (c). (Order Appointing Insurance Commissioner as Conservator and Restraining Order (Appointment Order), p. 1.) Paragraph 17 of the order prohibited

in relevant part "[a]ll persons . . . from instituting, prosecuting, or maintaining any . . . actions or proceedings to compel discovery or production of documents or testimony, . . . except after an order of this Court obtained after reasonable notice to the Conservator." On August 11, 2020, the Court denied Respondents' Verified Application to Vacate the November 4 Order Appointing the Commissioner as Conservator. (Order Denying Resp.'s Verified App. To Vacate the Nov. 4 Order Appointing the Comr. as Conservator, ex. A.)

In July 2020, CIC served discovery on the Commissioner without seeking leave of the Court. On September 15, 2020, the Court granted the Commissioner's Motion to Enforce, Motion to Quash and Motion for a Protective Order because "Paragraph 17 of the Conservation Order prohibits discovery on its face, absent leave of Court. There is no dispute that leave of Court was not sought in this instance."

On October 19, 2020, the Commissioner filed the Rehabilitation Application pursuant to Insurance Code section 1043.

On March 11, 2021, CIC filed this Motion.

## **DISCUSSION**

In its Motion, CIC seeks leave to "serve" the following discovery requests (CIC's Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery, at p. 1):

- (1) deposition notices for the three individuals who submitted declarations in support the Rehabilitation Plan;
- (2) a deposition notice for the individual who verified the Commissioner's ex parte conservator application;
- (3) requests for the production of documents covering four topics relating to the Commissioner's decision to pursue a conservatorship of CIC and the Rehabilitation Plan; and
- (4) a deposition notice for the person most knowledgeable (PMK) on those four topics.

The Commissioner does not contest CIC's right to receive documents pertaining to the fourth topic – the "grounds for all the provisions" of the Rehabilitation Plan. The Commissioner also does not contest CIC's right to depose the three individuals who submitted declarations in support of the Plan but seeks to limit the scope of those depositions to their declarations. The Commissioner does, however, challenge CIC's right to serve the remaining discovery. In particular, the Commissioner contends that

 leave to serve the three remaining document requests and the remaining two deposition notices should be denied because they are overbroad and irrelevant. As explained below, the Court finds that CIC should be given leave to serve the disputed discovery.

As a threshold matter, the Court finds that the Civil Discovery Act (Act) applies to this conservator proceeding. "By its terms . . . the [Act] applies to both 'civil action[s] and . . . special proceeding[s] of a civil nature.' "(City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 284; see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.020, subd. (a) & 2017.010.) As a result, "absent a statutory exemption precluding discovery, the [Act] applies 'to every civil action and special proceeding of a civil nature.' "(City of Los Angeles, at p. 285, emphasis added.) "A special proceeding of a civil nature is '[a] type of case which was not, under the common law or equity practice, either an action at law or a suit in equity.' "(People v. Superior Court (Cheek) (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 980, 988 (Cheek).) " 'A special proceeding has reference only to such proceedings as may be commenced independently of a pending action by petition or motion upon notice in order to obtain special relief.' "(Ibid.)

Applying these definitions, this conservator proceeding is undoubtedly a "special proceeding of a civil nature." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.020; see also *Cheek*, *supra*, 94 Cal. App.4th at p. 988.) Indeed, the California Supreme Court said so many decades ago. (See *Carpenter v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.* (1937) 10 Cal.2d 307, 327 [holding that "the proceedings here involved [--- conservator proceedings --] are obviously special proceedings"].) Thus, the Act applies unless there is a statutory exemption. But none appears to exist here. The Insurance Code is silent as to discovery rights, and nothing in that Code appears to exempt this conservator proceeding from the purview of the Act. The only statute cited by the Commissioner is Insurance Code section 1020. But nothing in section 1020 expressly or impliedly states that conservator proceedings are exempt from the Act. Even though section 1020, subdivision (a) may apply to discovery if it "interfer[es] with the commissioner or the proceeding," Petitioner provides no evidence that the requested discovery would do so. In any event, the Court could not find, and Petitioner did not cite, a single case even suggesting that the Act does not apply to conservator proceedings. To the contrary, several cases suggest that discovery is routinely permitted without any special or unusual limitations in conservator proceedings. (See, e.g., *Texas Commercial Bank v. Garamendi* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1239; *Roddis v. Strong* (1967) 62 Cal.App.2d 304, 306.)

The Court's ruling on CIC's anti-SLAPP motion does not compel a contrary conclusion. That ruling related to the applicability of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure – and not Part 4, which contains the Act. And unlike Part 2 – which limits its provisions to civil "action[s]" under Code of Civil Procedure section 22, rather than "special proceeding[s]" under section 23 – the Act found in Title 4, Part IV of the Code of Civil Procedure broadly defines "action" to include "special proceedings" like this conservator proceeding. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.020.)

Finally, the cases cited by the Commissioner at the hearing – Anderson v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co. (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 181 and McConnell v. All-Coverage Ins. Exchange Automobile and Fire (1064) 229 Cal.App.2d 735 – are inapposite. Both of those cases addressed the power of the court to award attorney fees, expenses, or costs from the assets of the conservatee in a conservator proceeding under the Insurance Code. Neither considered the applicability of the Act to such a proceeding, or the meaning of the phrase "special proceedings of a civil nature" as used in the Act. Even though those cases held that "the jurisdiction of the court is limited by the provisions of the statute governing the proceedings," this does not help the Commissioner because nothing in the Insurance Code limits the applicability of the Act. (Anderson, at p. 189; McConnell, at p. 741.)

Applying the Act here, the Court sees no basis for denying CIC leave to serve the disputed discovery. The main argument against granting the Motion asserted by the Commissioner is that the disputed discovery is irrelevant and overbroad. But the three categories of documents in dispute appear to be relevant to the Commissioner's request for approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. For example, discovery into the grounds for the conservatorship is relevant, because the Plan is supposed "to resolve the issues requiring the Conservation Proceeding." (Rehab. Plan, Recital C.) Indeed, California Courts have rejected a proposed rehabilitation plan because its provisions had nothing to do with the reason for the conservator proceeding – i.e., the "insolvency" of the conservator. (See *Commercial Natl. Bank v. Superior Court* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 393, 410.) Likewise, the process used by the Commissioner to develop the Rehabilitation Plan may be relevant for determining whether any of its provisions are "arbitrary." (*Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins.* (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 480, 485.) Finally, to the extent that the disputed categories include documents that are not relevant, these concerns can be addressed through meet and confer, informal discovery conferences, and motions to compel, if necessary.

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The Commissioner's claim of undue burden and delay also does not support denying CIC leave to serve the disputed discovery where, as here, the Commissioner provides no evidence to support his claim. For example, the Commissioner does not identify the volume of documents being sought by CIC or the amount of time that it would take the Commissioner to produce those documents. Absent some evidence to support this claim, the Court cannot deny CIC leave to serve discovery that otherwise seeks relevant information, much less conclude that the requested discovery would interfere with "the commissioner or the proceeding." (Ins. Code, § 1020, subd. (a).)

Because the topics covered by the document requests appear to be relevant, leave to serve the PMK deposition notice also cannot be denied. Indeed, the Commissioner's concession that the fourth document request is proper necessarily establishes that a PMK deposition relating to that request is also proper. Likewise, the deposition of Henley, the person who verified Petitioner's ex parte conservator application, is relevant because the Rehabilitation Plan must be related to the grounds for the conservatorship. Finally, Petitioner has provided no grounds for placing any limitations on the three depositions of the declarants beyond the limitations otherwise placed on those depositions by the Act.

In granting CIC leave to serve the requested discovery, however, the Court is not holding that CIC is entitled to all of the discovery it seeks to serve without limitation. "[T]he right to civil discovery in special proceedings of a civil nature remains subject to the trial court's authority to manage discovery." (Cheek, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 988.) Thus, discovery must still be "relevant to the subject matter." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) And in this conservator proceeding, the purpose of any discovery sought by the parties must therefore relate to whether the Rehabilitation Plan is "reasonably related to the public interest" and not "arbitrary or improperly discriminatory." (Golden Eagle, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 484-485, internal quotations omitted.) Finally, in determining the proper scope of discovery, "the trial court must keep in mind both the narrow scope of permissible discovery and the need for expeditious adjudication." (Cheek, at p. 991.)

Here, the Commissioner has not had the opportunity to respond to CIC's discovery requests or assert any objections. Thus, in accordance with the Act, the Commissioner may still respond to the discovery requests after they have been served and assert any applicable privileges and objections. And

any disputes over those privileges and objections are subject to the usual procedures for resolving them, including meet and confer, informal discovery conferences, and motions to compel.

Finally, in granting this Motion, the Court is only authorizing CIC to serve the document requests and deposition notices listed in paragraph 4 and exhibits A through F of the Declaration of Shand Stephens.

## ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that CIC's Motion is GRANTED. CIC may serve the document requests and deposition notices listed in paragraph 4 and exhibits A through F of the Declaration of Shand Stephens. The Commissioner may respond to those discovery requests in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Discovery Act.

Dated: April 26, 2021

Danny Y. Chou

Judge of the Superior Court